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ABSTRACT
EMIL RUSEV: The Relative Effectivenes of Welfare
Programs, Earnings Subsidies, and Child Care Subsidies as
Work Incentives for Single Mothers
(Under the direction of Wilbert van der Klaauw)
Welfare programs, earnings subsidies, and child care subsidies provide incentives for single
parents to escape poverty through employment. Each of these policies has been studied in the
economics literature, but little is known about how well they perform relative to each other.
In this dissertation I consider the impact of tax and transfer programs on welfare take-up,
paid child care usage, and hours of work for single mothers. I estimate a structural model of
labor supply and multiple program participation by Simulated Maximum Likelihood, utilizing
data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation. I use the estimates to simulate
the impact of several alternative policy reforms, such as changes in the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) program parameters, as well as provision of child care and wage subsidies.
I find that targeted wage subsidies are the most cost-effective method of encouraging work
among single mothers. While not as effective as wage subsidies, the EITC and child care
subsidies also induce work and reduce poverty. Additionally, I apply the recently proposed
consistent Transformed Simulated Frequency (TSF) estimator by Lee and Song (2006) and
compare the results with those from the more traditional smoothed SMLE (Lerman and
Manski 1981).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Welfare programs, earnings subsidies, and child care subsidies provide alternative ap-
proaches to encourage single mothers to work and thereby potentially bring them out of
poverty. Expenditures on the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) more than doubled to $27
billion between 1993 and 1997 and this expansion has been credited with causing a consider-
able increase in employment among single mothers. Could the effects of the EITC have been
achieved at a lower cost with a different policy? We know little about the relative performance
of alternative policies targeted at increasing the well-being of single mothers.
Economists have considered the effects of the Welfare Reform of 1996 and the EITC ex-
pansions on earnings and hours of work by comparing pre- and post-reform outcomes, but
their analyses are generally unable to disentangle the separate impacts of the two programs.
It is difficult, using the simple before- and after comparison strategy (with or without a com-
parison group), to assess how multiple programs interact in influencing work decisions. The
unified structural analysis of work and multiple welfare program participation in this paper
alleviates this problem by explicitly modeling individual choices given the choice set induced
by various programs. In order to determine the impact of tax and welfare programs on the
work decisions of single mothers, I estimate a structural model of labor supply and multiple
program participation by Simulated Maximum Likelihood. In the model, individuals maxi-
mize their utility by choosing how much labor to supply and whether to participate in either
or both Food Stamps (FS) and the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Using
state-level benefit formulas, the budget constraint takes into account welfare benefits, income
taxes, and tax credits for every feasible combination of employment and welfare alternatives.
The model also incorporates child care costs and subsidies as important determinants of labor
supply. I estimate the model with data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP) and use the estimates to simulate the impact of several alternative policy reforms,
including changes in the EITC, provision of child care, wage subsidies, and certain features
of the United Kingdom’s version of the EITC.
The results indicate that, for equal cost, a subsidized minimum wage outperforms the
EITC in increasing employment and reducing poverty among single mothers by better tar-
geting low-wage workers. Likewise, reallocating EITC funds into child care subsidy programs
yields better results in terms of increased employment and well-being of the poor. The EITC
is effective in reducing poverty but has the additional effect of reducing the hours of those
already working. If TANF recipients decide to work more, they do not receive the full ad-
ditional income since their TANF benefits are reduced. Reductions in the rate at which the
benefit is phased out, while keeping the maximum benefit the same, does little to affect the
labor supply and well-being of single mothers as workers with higher earnings become eligible
for benefits.
I compare the results from two different SML methods - a smooth Lerman and Manski
(1981) SML estimator and Lee and Song’s (2006) Transformed Simulated Frequency (TSF)
SML estimator. While the results are very similar for large simulation size, the TSF estimator
performs better with fewer simulations.
Chapter 2 provides a brief summary of previous findings in the literature on the impact of
work-incentive reforms, with an emphasis on TANF, EITC, and child care subsidies. Chapter
3 summarizes the history, goals, and rules of the programs in place in 1997, the year for
which I use SIPP data. Chapter 4 lays out the econometric model and the estimation method.
Chapter 5 describes the data. Chapter 6 discusses the results and policy simulations. Chapter
7 concludes.
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Chapter 2
Previous Findings
The effects of the EITC on work have been studied extensively. Reduced form studies
of the EITC mostly focus on different trends for various groups of the population. They
try to identify an average treatment effect of a policy change, relying on provisions that
affected a treatment and a comparison group differently. Single mothers have received special
attention in the EITC literature. Their employment outcomes over time have been compared
with those of various comparison groups (single women without children, black men). Meyer
and Rosenbaum (2000) also use married mothers as a control group, finding that the rise in
employment of single mothers is not likely a result of factors affecting all mothers, such as
child care subsidies.
While comparison groups are rarely perfect and can be criticized, the consistently positive
estimated effect of the EITC on employment, using a variety of comparison groups strongly
suggests a causal effect of the major EITC expansions in the 1980s and 1990 s (Meyer and
Rosenbaum 2000; Eissa and Liebman 1996; Ellwood 2000). These findings are also supported
by studies using other econometric methods (Dickert, Houser and Scholz 1995; Meyer and
Rosenbaum 2001; Keane and Moffitt 1998).1
There have been several complete reviews of the literature regarding the effects of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC; the predecessor of TANF) on labor supply
(Danziger et al. 1981; Moffitt 1992; Hoynes 1997) and a major review of the TANF program by
Moffitt (2003). Even though TANF introduced new dimensions, intended to encourage work
1For a complete survey of work on the EITC, see Hotz and Scholz (2003)
(work requirements, time limits), research on AFDC is relevant since the incentives implied
by the benefit formulas have not changed dramatically. Generally, studies on AFDC confirm
the prediction of the static labor supply model that the program discouraged work. Increased
generosity of the benefits is associated with higher welfare participation rates. Studies have
consistently found that hours worked are quite insensitive to reductions in the rate at which
benefits are phased out with the increase in income (see Moffitt 1992; Hoynes 1996; Keane and
Moffitt 1998). Generally, TANF benefits have a similar structure, and the implicit marginal
tax rates in TANF benefit formulas could be expected to have similar effects.
Due to the introduction of new features, such as work requirements and time limits, much
of the TANF research has been focused in a different direction: estimating the overall effect
of replacing AFDC with TANF. Studies have generally used cross-state variation in timing
of welfare introduction to identify treatment effects of the welfare reform on earnings, labor
supply, and AFDC-TANF participation. Moffitt (2003) discusses TANF research problems in
detail. First, the introduction of TANF occurred at approximately the same time in all states,
making the evaluation of individual components of TANF difficult. Second, states were free to
not only set the benefit parameters (benefit standard, benefit tax rates, exemptions) but also
the type of benefit formulas used. Generally cross-state variation is good for identification of
estimated parameters but the rules are more complicated than under AFDC and modeling
those rules is challenging.
Research based on cross-state variation in the timing of the introduction of pre-1996 wel-
fare waivers generally finds positive effects on employment and negative effects on AFDC
participation (Schoeni and Blank 2000; O’Neill 2001; Bloom and Michalopoulos 2001). Most
studies that evaluated the effects of the actual introduction of the Welfare Reform have
employed difference-in-difference estimators by using variation in outcome trends across dif-
ferent groups of the population (e.g., low-wage and high-wage single mothers). Results vary
significantly and attribute either positive (McKernan 2000), negative (Wallace 1999), or in-
determinate (Ellwood 2000) effects to TANF on employment.
A large number of studies have estimated the effects of the price of child care on employ-
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ment of mothers. To the extent that child care subsidies reduce the net price of child care,
they are expected to provide a work incentive. The majority of papers estimate a binomial
choice model of work, with the price of child care predicted from a child care expenditure
equation estimated on the subsample of cases for which child care expenditures are reported
(Connely 1992; Kimmel 2000; Anderson 2000 and Levine). Other models estimate the work
decision equation jointly with equations that model hours of care use (Blau and Robins 1991;
Ribar 1992). Research results suggest that subsidies tend to increase employment rates of
mothers of young children but the estimated price elasticities vary from 0.06 to -1.26, even
though some studies use the same sources of data. Blau (2003) suggests that the variation in
econometric techniques and specifications is very likely a main reason for these inconsisten-
cies. Several studies focus on the effect of availability of a child care subsidy on employment,
using actual subsidy programs and overall find it to be positive. Most (Gelbach 2002; Mey-
ers, Heintze, and Wolf 2002; Blau and Tekin 2002) report no information on either child care
prices or the size of the subsidy, so an elasticity cannot be computed.
Food Stamp studies usually focus on the general effectiveness of the program, and whether
aid gets to the intended recipients. This is understandable, since the program is intended as
safety net, fighting undernutrition. Work disincentives, caused by FS, are mostly considered
jointly with those caused by the AFDC/TANF programs. The estimated effects of moderate
changes in the maximum benefits or benefit phase-out rates on hours worked for single mothers
are weak (Fraker and Moffitt, 1988; Keane and Moffitt, 1998). 2 I include Food Stamp benefits
in the budget constraint and briefly discuss takeup of benefits in the results section.
In this work I analyze the joint and separate effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit, Food
stamps, child care subsidies and TANF on employment and welfare parficipation decisions of
single mothers by developing and estimating a unified behavioral model. Before describing
the model and its estimation with data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation,
I will first discuss in more detail the welfare programs the women in my estimation sample
faced.
2See Currie (2003) for a more detailed review of work disincentives of food programs in the U.S.
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Chapter 3
Overview of the Programs
3.1 History, Rules, and Goals
The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program was introduced with the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) in 1996. It replaced the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
welfare program as the main federal welfare program in the United States. The new act
specified a block grant funding scheme from the federal government to the states to replace
AFDC matching grants. It also imposed time limits on benefit receipt and more stringent
requirements, such as job training, job search, and work. In addition to being able to choose
the benefit levels, states are also free to set their own eligibility restrictions and design the
benefit formulas. Each state decides, whether to use an asset eligibility test, what is considered
an asset, and what fraction of an asset’s value counts for TANF purposes. Similarly, states
have a great degree of control over income eligibility tests.
For participants, the path to receiving benefits consists of determining their eligibility and
computing the benefits. To be eligible, the ’assistance unit’ first has to pass a set of tests based
on family composition and demographic characteristics of its members. Most importantly, the
family needs to include a dependent child. States differ in how they treat two-parent families,
families headed by a minor, pregnant women, and non-citizens. In addition to satisfying the
nonfinancial eligibility tests, the family must have assets below a certain specified level, which
varies from state to state. Finally, an income test is applied by comparing family income to
an eligibility threshold. Certain portions and types of income are disregarded. If the family
passes the income test, it is eligible for the program, and a benefit is computed.
To calculate benefits, states use a variety of different formulas but they all share some
general principles. Usually, families can disregard a part of their earned income. The resulting
’net income’ is subtracted from the state payment standard for a family with zero income,
which varies by family size. The benefit is then a fraction of the difference between the pay-
ment standard and the net income. Table 3.2 summarizes TANF benefit formula parameters
for all states, for a family of three. On average, single mother households in my sample are
eligible for $323 per month, but benefits vary greatly across states, from $137 in Alabama
to $923 in Alaska. Benefit schedules in most states imply marginal tax rates of 100 percent.
Some of them also impose a maximum benefit amount that can be potentially lower than the
one implied by the benefit formula table 3.2.
The food stamp program was first implemented in 1964, with the current structure in effect
since 1977. The goal of the program is to provide food assistance to low-income households.
It is administered by the federal government and there is no variation in the benefit formula
across states. To be eligible for food stamp benefits, the household must pass net income
and asset tests, after which the food stamp formula is applied and the benefit determined. A
household’s benefit amount is determined by its monthly net income, which is defined as its
monthly gross income minus deductions. The benefit amount is determined as
FS =MAX(M − 0.3 ∗Net Income, 0)
where M varied from $218 for a family of two to $806 for a family of nine or more in 1997.
In 1997, the amounts disregarded from earnings included a standard deduction of $134; an
earned income deduction of 20 percent; dependent care expenses; legally owed child support;
and excess shelter deductions, with the first two deductions being the most significant ones.
The Federal Earned Income Tax Credit was established in 1975 as a modest work bonus
to offset Social Security taxes of low-income individuals. Between 1978 and 1986 the EITC
benefit was not adjusted for inflation. With the introduction of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA86) the EITC was increased back up to its 1975 level in real terms. The federal EITC
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became more generous with the 1990 and 1993 tax bills. (See Hotz and Scholz (2003) for
a detailed history of the EITC.) The EITC has been politically popular as a strong work
incentive.
Taxpayers can claim their EITC by providing eligibility information in a special section of
their federal tax return form. To be eligible for the EITC, a taxpayer needs to have positive
earned income below a certain threshold, which depends on the number of qualifying children
and the presence of a spouse. A qualifying child must be under 19 years of age (24 if a
full-time student). The claimant of the credit must be a parent or a grandparent of the child,
or the child must be a foster child. In 1997, taxpayers with at least 2 qualifying children
could receive EITC at a rate of 40 percent of each dollar of earnings up to an income level of
$9,140, for a maximum credit of $3,656. If income is above $9,140 but less than $11,930, the
maximum credit is received. At income levels above $11,930, the credit is phased out at a rate
of 21.06 percent per marginal dollar of earnings so that taxpayers with income above $29,290
are not eligible to receive any tax credit. For taxpayers with only one child the phase-in rate
is 34 percent, the maximum credit is $2,210 for income up to $11,930 and the phase-out rate
is 15.98 percent. The tax credit is refundable, which means that if the credit exceeds the tax
liability, the Treasury Department will pay back the difference to the taxpayer. A summary
of program parameters for the period 1975-2003 is presented in Table 3.3.
Take-up of the EITC is an interesting question in its own right. Household surveys
generally provide fairly detailed information that allows one to determine eligibility, but
information on take-up is either not provided or imprecise (the topical module that includes
EITC data in the SIPP has a very low response rate). Scholz (1994) has a preferred estimate
of between 80 and 86 percent for the general eligible population for 1990. In a report by
the U.S. General Accountability Office (1998), the participation rates for households with
one and two qualifying children were 96 and 93 percent, respectively. The GAO-estimated
participation rates for households with three or more children are somewhat lower.
Following the increased attention from the federal government with TRA86, some states
began introducing their own earned income tax credits in the late 1980s. In 1997, nine states
had their own EITC. In some of these states the credit was refundable, while in others it
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was not (the credit was limited only to the amount of the state tax liability). The amount
of the credit is typically defined as a fraction of the federal credit and varies between 4 and
43 percent (see Table 3.1). Therefore, the eligibility rules for the federal credit apply. The
maximum state EITC could vary between $110 for a family with one child in the state of
Oregon to $1,572 for a family with three or more children in Wisconsin.
Since World War II, a rapidly growing fraction of mothers in the U.S. has chosen to be
part of the labor force. A large number of mostly federally funded programs that subsidize
child care expenses were introduced over time to help finance the increased need for child care
faced by low-income families. By the 1990s a complex system of child care subsidies was in
place. The programs were administered by a large number of federal agencies. In 1994, over
90 federal child care related programs were active (GAO 1998). Coordination in provision
of child care subsidies was very difficult, with different eligibility and application rules for
different programs.1
PRWORA consolidated several major child care programs into a single child care block
grant, the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF). Federal CCDF funds received by
states depend in part on the number of children and state income. Another part of CCDF
funding requires matching spending by the states, which have to maintain expenditures for
child care programs at certain minimum levels. The states set eligibility criteria, subject to
some restrictions. They may assist families with incomes up to 85 percent of the state median
income but are also allowed to choose a lower threshold. Parents must be involved in work or
work related activities. States must use at least 70 percent of their mandatory and matching
funds to assist families on welfare or likely to go on welfare. States are supposed to issue
vouchers that families can use to purchase care from any child care provider. Sometimes states
can also purchase slots in child care centers directly. Eligibility for child care assistance and
the amount of that assistance are determined by the state and are based on an Annual Income
Eligibility Level, the age of the child, and the cost of child care to the family. However, the
subsidy is financed through a block grant ($4 billion in 1997) which covers only an estimated
1An extensive description of the history of child care subsidy programs can be found in Blau (2003) and
the Green Book (1998).
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15 percent of eligible families (Child Care Bureau 1999). While CCDF is the major means-
tested child subsidy program, it accounts for less than 50% of federal and state expenditures.
Other major programs are the Dependent Children Tax Credit, Head Start, the Child and
adult Care Food Program, and the Title XX Social Services Block Grant.2
3.2 Incentives
In this section I present the work incentives provided by the programs of interest. It
is important to understand these since programs often have undesirable effects which are
overlooked at the time of implementation of the programs.
The static labor supply model is simple and very useful for understanding the potential
effects of modifying program parameters on the optimal work choices of single mothers.
In the absence of any government transfers in figure 3.1 below, the individual budget
constraint in hours-of-work - consumption space will be AE, with a slope of −w. The intro-
duction of the EITC changes the budget constraint to be ABCDE instead. Let us consider
how individuals with various preferences are affected by the EITC. For some nonworking
individuals in the absence of the EITC (type I preferences on the graph) it will be optimal
to start working. In this phase-in region, the EITC is essentially a 40% wage subsidy that
increases the returns from participation in the labor market. In other words, there is a posi-
tive substitution effect on the number of hours worked, and no income effect for nonworkers.
Consequently, the EITC unambiguously encourages work.
For type II individuals, who are around the flat range of the credit, there is no substitution
effect on hours of work. There will only be an income effect which economics literature
indicates is negative, that is, leisure is a normal good. Type III individuals will experience
an income effect, as well as a negative substitution effect, as their income is taxed implicitly
in the phase-out range of the credit. In short, the static labor supply model expects an
unambiguously positive effect on labor force participation and a negative effect on the hours
2See Blau (2003) for details
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Figure 3.1: EITC effects on work decisions
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of work for individuals already in the labor force.
Let us consider the effects of a child care subsidy. The line labelled w on graph 3.2 is,
again, the budget constraint in the absence of any transfers. If the mother has to incur an
hourly cost of child care, p, then the budget constraint becomes w− p. The child care price p
may make the mother find it optimal not to work. Providing a child care subsidy of s has the
potential of inducing some mothers to join the labor force, as indicated by the indifference
curves on the graph. This simple linear subsidy example is identical to the phase-in range
of the EITC and will predict an increase in employment. For individuals already in the
labor force, there will be a positive substitituion effect on hours worked and an income effect.
Consequently, the effect on hours of work for workers will depend on the relative magnitudes
of the income and substitution effects. While child care subsidies are not typically linear, this
will affect the size of the effect but not its direction.
In the same static labor supply framework, the non-transfer budget constraint in figure
3.3 is AD. The introduction of TANF shifts the constraint to ABCD. This causes individuals
similar to type I to quit work and start collecting welfare, which is less likely to happen if
the marginal tax rate implied by the TANF benefit schedule is reduced. On the graph this
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Figure 3.2: Effects of a linear child care subsidy on work decisions
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Figure 3.3: Effects of TANF on work decisions
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Table 3.1: State EITC in states that had enacted their own credit by 1997
State Refundable Time enacted % of Credit
Iowa No 6.5% of fed. EITC
Maryland No 1987 50% of fed. EITC non-refundable, 20% refundable
Massachusetts Yes 1997 15% of fed. EITC
Minnesota Yes 1991/92 varies depending on income, children, etc.; average 33%
New York Yes 1994 30% of fed. EITC
Oregon No 1997 5% of fed. EITC
Rhode Island No 1986 25% of fed. EITC
Vermont Yes 1988 32% of fed. EITC
Wisconsin Yes 1989 4% of fed. EITC if 1 child, 14% 2 children, 43% 3 or more children
Source: The Hatcher Group, State EITC On-Line Resource Center at www. stateeitc.com
is illustrated by replacing the BC portion of the budget line (100% marginal tax rate in this
example) by CC ′. This, in turn, has the potential of reducing hours of work for individuals
of type II who start working less in order to become eligible or to increase their benefits.
An increase in AB, on the other hand, will tend to decrease hours of work. The structure of
Food Stamps benefits is the same as the one for TANF, as evident from the formula above,
so we expect the same directions of employment incentives.
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Table 3.2: TANF Benefit Computation for a Family of Three, 1997
State Form of Benefit Formula Benefit Maximum % in
Standard Benefit Formula
Alabama B. St. - Net Income 164 n.a. 100
Alaska Smaller of (% of B. St. - Net Income) or Max B. 1057 923 87.43
Arizona B. St. - Net Income 347 n.a. 100
Arkansas Flat Amount of $204 n.a. n.a. 100
California B. St. - Net Income 565 n.a. 100
Colorado % of (B. St. - Net Income) 421 n.a. 84.75
Connecticut B. St. - Net Income 543 n.a. 100
Delaware Smaller of (% of (B. St. - Net Income)) or Max B. 786 338 50
D.C. B. St. - Net Income 379 n.a. 100
Florida B. St. - Net Income 303 n.a. 100
Georgia Smaller of (B. St. - Net Income) or Max B. 424 280 100
Hawaii B. St. - Net Income 570 n.a. 100
Idaho Smaller of (B. St. - Net Income) or Max B. 991 317 100
Illinois B. St. - Net Income 337 n.a. 100
Indiana B. St. - Net Income 288 n.a. 100
Iowa B. St. - Net Income 426 n.a. 100
Kansas B. St. - Net Income 429 n.a. 100
Kentucky Smaller of (% of (B. St. - Net Income)) or Max B. 526 262 55
Louisiana B. St. - Net Income 190 n.a. 100
Maine Smaller of (B. St. - Net Income) or Max B. 553 418 100
Maryland B. St. - Net Income 377 n.a. 100
Massachusetts B. St. - Net Income 579 n.a. 100
Michigan B. St. - Net Income 459 n.a. 100
Minnesota B. St. - Net Income 532 n.a. 100
Mississippi Smaller of (% of (B. St. - Net Income)) or Max B. 368 120 60
Missouri B. St. - Net Income 292 n.a. 100
Montana B. St. - Net Income 438 n.a. 100
Nebraska B. St. - Net Income 342 n.a. 100
Nevada B. St. - Net Income 348 n.a. 100
New Hampshire B. St. - Net Income 550 n.a. 100
New Jersey B. St. - Net Income 424 n.a. 100
New Mexico B. St. - Net Income 389 n.a. 100
New York B. St. - Net Income 577 n.a. 100
North Carolina % of (B. St. - Net Income) 544 n.a. 50
North Dakota % of (B. St. - Net Income) 431 n.a. 59.56
Ohio B. St. - Net Income 341 n.a. 100
Oklahoma B. St. - Net Income 307 n.a. 100
Oregon B. St. - Net Income 460 n.a. 100
Pennsylvania B. St. - Net Income 403 n.a. 100
Rhode Island B. St. - Net Income 554 n.a. 100
South Carolina Smaller of (B. St. - Net Income) or Max B. 540 200 100
South Dakota % of (B. St. - Net Income) 507 n.a. 85
Tennessee Smaller of (B. St. - Net Income) or Max B. 677 185 100
Texas B. St. - Net Income 188 n.a. 100
Utah B. St. - Net Income 426 n.a. n.a.
Vermont B. St. - Net Income 611 n.a. 100
Virginia Smaller of ((B. St. - Net Income) or Max B.) Poverty 291 100
Washington Smaller of (B. St. - Net Income) or Max B. 546 546 100
West Virginia B. St. - Net Income 253 n.a. 100
Wisconsin B. St. - Net Income 518 n.a. 100
Wyoming Smaller of (B. St. - Net Income) or Max B. 590 340 100
Source: The Welfare Rules Database, http://anfdata.urban.org/WRD
Note: B. St. = Benefit Standard
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Table 3.3: Federal EITC parameters, 1975-2003
No. of Phase-in End of Maximum Phase-out Phase-out range
Year children rate Phase-in range credit rate Begin End
1975-1978 10 4,000 400 10 4,000 8,000
1979-1984 10 5,000 500 12.5 6,000 10,000
1985-1986 14 5,000 550 12.22 6,500 11,000
1987 14 6,080 851 10 6,920 15,432
1988 14 6,240 874 10 9,840 18,576
1989 14 6,500 910 10 10,240 19,340
1990 14 6,810 953 10 10,730 20,264
1991 one child 16.7 7,140 1,192 11.93 11,250 21,250
two children 17.3 7,140 1,235 12.36 11,250 21,250
1992 one child 17.6 7,520 1,324 12.57 11,840 22,370
two children 18.4 7,520 1,384 13.14 11,840 22,370
1993 one child 18.5 7,750 1,434 13.21 12,200 23,050
two children 19.5 7,750 1,511 13.93 12,200 23,050
1994 no child 7.65 4,000 306 7.65 5,000 9,000
one child 26.3 7,750 2,038 15.98 11,000 23,755
two children 30 8,425 2,528 17.68 11,000 25,296
1995 no child 7.65 4,100 314 7.65 5,130 9,230
one child 34 6,160 2,094 15.98 11,290 24,396
two children 36 8,640 3,110 20.22 11,290 26,673
1996 no child 7.65 4,220 323 7.65 5,280 9,500
one child 34 6,330 2,152 15.98 11,610 25,078
two children 40 8,890 3,556 21.06 11,610 28,495
1997 no child 7.65 4,340 332 7.65 5,430 9,770
one child 34 6,500 2,210 15.98 11,930 25,750
two children 40 9,140 3,656 21.06 11,930 29,290
1998 no child 7.65 4,460 341 7.65 5,570 10,030
one child 34 6,680 2,271 15.98 12,260 26,473
two children 40 9,390 3,756 21.06 12,260 30,095
1999 no child 7.65 4,530 347 7.65 5,670 10,200
one child 34 6,800 2,312 15.98 12,460 26,928
two children 40 9,540 3,816 21.06 12,460 30,580
2000 no child 7.65 4,610 353 7.65 5,770 10,380
one child 34 6,920 2,353 15.98 12,690 27,415
two children 40 9,720 3,888 21.06 12,690 31,152
2001 no child 7.65 4,760 364 7.65 5,950 10,710
one child 34 7,140 2,428 15.98 13,090 28,281
two children 40 10,020 4,008 21.06 13,090 32,121
2002 no child 7.65 4,910 376 7.65 6,150 11,060
one child 34 7,370 2,506 15.98 13,520 29,201
two children 40 10,350 4,140 21.06 13,520 33,178
2003 no child 7.65 4,990 382 7.65 6,240 11,230
one child 34 7,490 2,547 15.98 13,730 29,666
two children 40 10,510 4,204 21.06 13,730 33,692
16
Chapter 4
Model and Estimataion
4.1 Model
To analyze the choices single mothers make regarding work, welfare participation, and
child care expenditures, I specify a discrete choice model, partially based on Keane and Moffitt
(1998), that characterizes the preferences and constraints these mothers faced in 1997.
Mothers in the model have three work-hours choices - 0 (no work), 20 (part-time work),
and 40 (full-time work). The distinction between part- and full-time is crucial because most
mothers who work full-time earn too much to qualify for welfare, while low-wage part-time
workers typically have earnings below the eligibility threshold. Part- and full-timers are also
likely to have different child care needs and therefore different costs.
As will be shown later in the paper when describing the data, participation rates for TANF
and Food Stamps in the sample are low. Thirty-eight percent of non-workers participate in
neither program. I estimate that the take-up rate of TANF among eligible single mothers
is around 38 percent (This is consistent with Moffitt (2003)). On the other hand, a large
number of part-time workers could increase their disposable income by simply quitting their
jobs and collecting welfare, since the combined implicit marginal tax rate of TANF and FS
is more than 100 percent. These two observations imply that there are costs associated
with welfare participation. Some examples of such costs are disutility from dealing with
administrative issues to sign up for welfare programs, direct monetary costs, and the stigma
of being on welfare (Moffitt 1983). Accounting for non-monetary costs of participation requires
joint estimation of the labor supply decision and program participation since unobservable
determinants of these choices are likely to be correlated.
On the other hand, previous work has estimated EITC take-up rates of between 80 and
96 percent (Scholz 1994, GAO 1998), and to avoid having to model an additional decision, I
therefore assume in this model that families always collect the federal and state EITC benefits
for which they are eligible.
In specifying the utility function, I follow Keane and Moffitt (1998) and define a function
that is quadratic in consumption and hours of work:
U(H,Y, PT , PF ) = αH + Y + βHHH2 + βY Y Y 2 + ψTPT + ψFPF + ψTFPTPF
+βHYHY + δTHPT + δFHPF + ηTY PT + ηFY PT , (4.1)
where H is hours of work, Pm is an indicator variable for participation in program m (m = T
for TANF, m = F for Food Stamps), Y is income (assumed to be equal to consumption), and
α = x′αα+ α. (4.2)
ψm = x′mψm + m,m = T, F (4.3)
Here, α is the marginal utility of work at zero hours, which is allowed to vary across individu-
als with observable (x) and unobservable characteristics (α). ψT and ψF capture the utility
costs of program participation in TANF and FS, respectively. The sign of ψTF indicates
whether the cost of participating in both programs is different from the sum of the costs of
participating in these programs separately. It is possible that mothers with different levels
of consumption and hours of work have different preferences towards welfare participation.
These effects are captured in the utility function by the coefficients on the interaction terms
between Y and H with the program participation indicators, δT ,δF ,ηT , and ηF . I do not
explicitly impose TANF work requirements in the model and, currently, there are no control
variables in equation (4.3) to account for utility differences across states due to different ac-
tivities requirements. The effects of TANF work requirements that are common across states
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are captured by coefficients on costs of participation, ψT , ψTF , δT , and ηT .
The individual’s budget constraint is determined by her wage rate, hours of work, nonlabor
nontransfer income, net tax, welfare benefits, and child care expenditures:
Y (H,PT , PF ) =
wH +N +
∑
m=T,F
PmBm(H,w,x,z)− c−Net Tax(H,w,x,z), (4.4)
where Bm(·) is the benefit function of program m,
N is nonlabor nontransfer income,
c is the total cost of child care,
w is the wage rate,
x is a vector of personal and family composition characteristics, and
z is a vector of regional characteristics.
It will be assumed that parents file tax returns as heads of their households, claim the
standard deduction, and always take up the EITC.
An important feature of my model, not included in the model of Keane and Moffitt
(1998), are child care expenditures and subsidies. As mentioned above, child care subsidies
are typically not an entitlement, so a modeling strategy different than the one for TANF and
FS is needed.
At the time of the work and welfare participation decisions, each mother is aware of
whether or not free child care is available from family and friends if she decides to work. Let
If be an indicator for the availability of free child care. The availability of free child care
is assumed to be exogenous, with the probability of an offer of free child care specified as a
function of demographic and geographic variables:
P (If = 1) = Φ(x′fβf ), (4.5)
where x′f also includes an indicator for whether a grandparent of the child resides in the
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household and Φ(·) represents the standard normal cumulative distribution. There is also a
chance that the state will provide a subsidy for child care to the family. The subsidy typically
does not cover all expenses and requires a copayment by the family. Let Is be an indicator for
the availability of a child care subsidy. The subsidy availability is also treated as exogenous,
with the probability that a subsidy is available modeled as
P (Is = 1) = Φ(X ′sβs) . (4.6)
In the SIPP, respondents provide information on how much they pay for child care ar-
rangements and whether or not they receive a government child care subsidy. While we
observe subsidy receipt and unpaid child care use, we do not observe whether non-recipients
were offered a subsidy, or whether non-users of free care had the option of using free care. It
is assumed that if the mother decides to work and free or subsidized care is available, then
she will always prefer free care to subsidized care. Either of these options is also better than
having to pay the full amount.1 Thus, child care is assumed to be a homogeneous good - care
is classified as either paid or unpaid, regardless of who provides it.
Using this information, I specify a child care price equation as:
ln c = x′cβc + γhI(H = Hfull time)− γsIs + c, (4.7)
where x′c includes number of children under 6 and 15 years of age and whether a grandparent
is in the household. I(H = Hfull time) is included since one can reasonably expect that full-
time care costs (incurred by full-time workers) are higher. The size of the subsidy is not
reported in the data and is estimated through γs as a fraction of the cost. If a mother does
not work, she cares for the child herself and does not have to pay for care. If a positive
number of work hours is chosen and free care or a government subsidy is not available, she
has to pay the full cost of care.
1In the model, the mode of child care (paid or unpaid) does not have a direct impact on a mother’s utility
and operates solely through the budget constraint. This model cannot explain single parents who choose not
to work and also pay for care. I plan to relax some of these assumptions in future work.
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Wage offers are distributed according to
lnw = x′wβw + z
′
wγw + w, (4.8)
where x′w is a set of demographic and educational variables, and z
′
w represents labor market
characteristics.
With three hours choices and two programs, the total number of alternatives available is
12. The optimal choice is the one that gives the highest utility, given the budget constraint,
i.e.,
choose alternative j if Uj ≥ Uk, k = 1, 2, ..., 12 . (4.9)
The complete choice model consists of (4.2), and (4.3), inserted into (4.1), the budget con-
straint (4.4) , and the choice rule (4.9).
4.2 Likelihood Function
The estimation sample, discussed in detail below, contains information on the labor supply,
child care use, and welfare program participation decisions on a sample of single mothers.
With a total of 12 potential choice options, I define the indicators dij to equal one if individual
i is observed to make choice j, and equal to zero if not. I also observe for each employed
mother whether she pays for child care (dci = 1) or not (d
c
i = 0), and if she does, we know
whether she received a child care subsidy (dsi = 1) or not ( d
s
i = 0).
Let P (j|θ,x, If , Is) be the probability that hours-participation combination j is optimal,
conditional on observable characteristics and parameters of the model and conditional on offer
realizations of free and subsidized child care. Further, let P (j|θ,x, w, If , Is) be the probability
of choice j if conditioned on an observed wage offer w, and let P (j|θ,x, w, c, If , Is) be the
probability of choice j, conditional on an observed wage offer and observed child care costs c.
Then the log-likelihood function is
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L =
X
i∈N
12X
j=1
dij ln
1X
l=0
1X
k=0
P (IF = k) P (IS = l) P (j|θ,x, IF = l, IS = k)
+
X
i∈E
dci=0
12X
j=1
dij ln
n
P (If = 1)
1X
k=0
P (Is = k) P (j|θ, x, w, If = 1, Is = k) φ1(w)
o
(4.10)
+
X
i∈E
dci=1
12X
j=1
dij ln
n
P (If = 0) P (Is = d
s
i ) P (j|θ,x, w, c, If = 0, Is = dsi ) φ2(w, c)
o
,
where θ is the vector of parameters to be estimated, φ1 and φ2 are the univariate and bivariate
standard normal p.d.f. functions, evaluated at the normalized observed errors w and c, con-
ditional on the observed wage, or an observed wage and observed child care costs, respectively.
E and N are the subsets of employed and non-employed individuals in the sample.
Here we only know that a person received an offer of free child care if she is employed
and reports dci = 0. Further, we only know whether a person received an offer of a child care
subsidy if she worked, had nonzero childcare costs (dci = 1) and reported receiving a subsidy
(dsi = 1). As noted above, we assume that an offer of free care is always taken up, and a
subsidy offer is always taken up if free care is not available.
4.3 Estimation
To estimate the model, I first use the method of Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML)
(Lerman and Manski (1981)) rather than Maximum Likelihood (ML) due to the problems
discussed in detail by Keane and Moffitt (1998). ML requires computation of high-order
integrals whose limits of integration are practically impossible to determine. In the likelihood
function (4.10), the probabilities P (j|·) are replaced by simulators f(j|·): 2
f(j|·) =
exp(Ujρ )
1 +
∑12
k=1 exp(
Uk
ρ )
. (4.11)
Defining the probabilities as smooth functions of the parameters of the model (as in (4.11))
2See Keane and Moffitt(1998).
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makes the implementation of gradient optimization methods more practical. The smoothing
parameter ρ needs to be normalized.3 Higher values for ρ imply more smoothing and larger
improvement at each iteration (the algorithm will make larger steps because the likelihood
is flatter), but induce bias in the obtained estimates. As ρ is gradually reduced to zero, the
bias disappears, but a value that is too low causes the probabilities to become step functions
of the parameters of the model. This hinders the use of gradient optimization routines. A lot
of experimentation with simulated data shows that a good approach is to start with a larger
smoothing value and then use the estimates as starting values for estimation with a lower
value of ρ.
The simulated log-likelihood is only unbiased as the number of draws goes to infinity,
because for a finite number of draws,
E ln f(j|θ,x) 6= ln P (j|θ,x).
For my model, increasing the number of draws beyond 500 changes the estimates and
standard errors only marginally. Keane and Moffitt (1998) obtain approximately the same
estimates using SML as they do using the Method of Simulated Moments, which achieves
consistency for a finite number of random draws. Additionally, the smoothing specified above
circumvents the chance of a zero simulated probability, which is greater when trying to eval-
uate low probabilities and smaller simulation sizes.
However, to further investigate potential biases (including bias induced by the smoothing
technique), I also present estimation and simulation results for the model using Donghoon
Lee and Kyungchul Song’s Consistent Finite Simulation Size Simulated MLE (Lee and Song,
2006), hereafter referred to as the Transformed Simulated Frequency (TSF) estimator.
The estimator is defined as follows:
θˆ = arg max
θ
n∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
dij
{
−
R−mij(θ)−1∑
s=o
1
R− s +
ν(mi −j(θ))
R
}
I{mj(θ) < R}
3Here ρ = 5.0. This is a fairly low value relative to the utility values of over 300. Lower values of ρ did not
result in different estimates.
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where mij represents the number of times individual i has chosen option j, ν(mi −j(θ))
denotes the number of choices other than j that have been chosen at least once by individual
i. R is the simulation size and I is an indicator function.
If mj/R → p and R → ∞ then ν(mi −j(θ))R ≤ J−1R → 0, i.e. the correction to the log
probability log(p) = −∑R−mij(θ)−1s=o 1R−s is much more important for smaller simulation sizes.
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Chapter 5
Data
The primary data source is the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).
The analysis uses month four from the fourth wave of the 1996 panel and the conveniently
corresponding child care topical module. The calendar months covered in this wave include
March through June 1997. The core data files of the SIPP contain information on labor
force, TANF, and Food Stamp participation, family composition, educational attainment,
and various demographic characteristics. The time period in the model is the calendar month,
which is also the relevant period for TANF and FS eligibility and benefit recipiency. Federal
and state taxes and tax credits are rescaled from the yearly level accordingly.1
For workers, hourly wages are constructed as monthly wage and salary earnings divided
by the product of number of weeks in the reference month and usual weekly hours for the
reference period. Values above $50 were considered as outliers and excluded.
The child care topical module that was administered in the last month of the fourth wave
of the 1996 SIPP panel provides information about child care arrangements for all children
under 15 years of age. Information is available about the type of child care arrangements, the
care provider, cost of care, weekly hours of care, and where the care was provided. Data cover
both formal care (provided by care centers) and informal care (care by relatives, friends, etc.).
Respondents are asked if they received financial aid for child care from the government.2
This information is only available for workers who incurred child care costs.
1The earnings, labor force, and program participation data are at a monthly level. The model implicitly
assumes that the monthly choice reflects the annual choice that determines EITC
2The size of the subsidy itself is not reported and is estimated.
I use state-specific TANF rules to compute benefits used in the analysis. In the cases in
which the formula also varies within state, I apply the formula relevant to the majority of
the caseload for the relevant period.3 The formulas are complex but there is relatively little
interaction between them and the formulas for the EITC and Food Stamps. The EITC only
takes into account earned income and its provisions explicitly state that it cannot be counted
as income for the purposes of TANF and Food Stamps.4 Most notably, TANF benefits are
treated as income for Food Stamp benefit computation purposes. TANF and FS eligibility
requirements involve the value of the family’s assets. Data on assets were extracted from the
topical module of the third wave of the 1996 SIPP.
Interview month four of the fourth wave of the core data files from SIPP 1996 and the
corresponding child care topical module contain 86,173 individual observations. I do not use
958 of the observations because the state is not uniquely identified.5 Of the remaining
records, 3,253 belonged to women who were heads of single-headed families. The final sample
consists of 3,060 single mothers with at least one child under the age of 15 after dropping
women over the age of 60 (88 observations), observations for which participation in TANF or
Food Stamps was imputed (86), and observations for which weekly work hours were allocated
(19), in that order.6 I treated imputed wages and child care costs as randomly missing and
modified the likelihood function accordingly. Full-time work is defined as working at least 35
hours per week. Part-time covers those who worked 1-34 hours per week. Descriptive statistics
on key demographic variables are presented in Table 5.2. The mothers are on average 34 years
old, have 1.7 children under 15, and have a high school education.
As can be seen in Table 5.1, more than 16 percent of the sample work part time and
48.5 percent work full time. Overall, more than half of the single mothers who participate
in either TANF or the FS program, participate in both. As expected, non-workers are more
3For confidentiality reasons, geographical information in the SIPP only identifies states and large metropoli-
tan areas.
4Several states specify that TANF activities sanctions also affect receipts or benefits of Food Stamps.
5The states of Maine and Vermont share one state code. So do North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming.
6I used logical allocations but not observations for which a hot-deck or cold-deck allocation procedure was
applied.
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likely to participate in welfare programs - almost two-thirds of them participate in at least
one program, compared to 39 percent for part-time and 10 percent for full-time workers. This
is consistent with eligibility restrictions (income increases with hours of work). Regardless of
the work choice, Food Stamp participation is more likely than TANF participation.
Table 5.1: Actual probabilities for work/program participation choices in the data
Nonworkers Part-time Full-time (total)
FS=0,TANF=0 13.3% 10.1% 43.4% 66.8%
FS=1,TANF=0 5.5% 3.2% 3.4% 12.1%
FS=0,TANF=1 1.1% 0.3% 0.5% 1.9%
FS=1,TANF=1 15.0% 2.9% 1.2% 19.1%
(total) 34.9% 16.5% 48.5% 100.0%
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Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics and Budget Constraint Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 33.53 8.75 15 60
South 0.39 0.49 0 1
White 0.62 0.49 0 1
No.Children under 6 0.65 0.77 0 5
No.Children under 15 1.68 0.94 1 8
Years of education 12.12 2.50 0 21
Metropolitan Statistical Area 0.57 0.49 0 1
Average age of children 7.14 4.08 0 14
Size of Household 3.70 1.49 2 13
Grandparent of child in household 0.13 0.33 0 1
Child of at least age 12 in family 0.30 0.46 0 1
Total weekly child care costs if positive 111.26 94.08 2 700
Average hourly wage for workers 10.87 6.38 3 49
Average weekly hours (part-time) 25.61 10.84 0 72
Average weekly hours(full-time) 40.47 6.27 0 99
TANF for nonworkers 90.02 46.54 0 282.18
TANF for part-time workers 24.84 35.01 0 258.15
TANF for full-time workers 2.98 12.63 0 231.61
FS for nonworkers 72.13 27.70 0 201.5
FS for part-time workers 38.90 27.87 0 195.39
FS for full-time workers 7.07 16.12 16.12 182.05
Federal Tax for part-time workers 5.82 16.66 0 302.85
Federal Tax for full-time workers 42.79 44.41 0 553.23
State Tax for part-time workers 2.27 4.94 0 103.39
State Tax for full-time workers 10.93 13.13 0 193.53
Federal EITC for part-time workers 42.55 15.70 0 70.30
Federal EITC for full-time workers 26.85 22.67 0 70.30
State EITC for part-time workers 1.33 4.08 0 30.23
State EITC for full-time workers 0.74 2.88 0 30.23
Net Tax for part-time workers -35.78 30.42 -94.21 401.08
Net Tax for full-time workers 26.13 73.26 -94.12 745.77
Note: All budget constraint variables except the wage are at the weekly level
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Chapter 6
Results and Policy Simulations
6.1 Results
The estimates of the model parameters are provided in table 6.2. Most of the parameters
have the sign and magnitude as expected from previous research. Children are associated with
lower preferences for work and higher preferences for participating in welfare programs. Older,
white mothers with higher levels of education have lower disutility of work. As expected, wages
are higher for older white women, who do not live in the South. Costs of welfare participation
are higher for older, white, and better educated mothers.
Families with more children, in which the parent works, tend to incur higher child care
costs. If available, government-provided subsidies reduce child care costs by 79 percent.1
The number of young children in the family has a strong positive effect on the probability
of paying for care if the mother works, which could indirectly reflect preferences of mothers
towards caring for their young children, or, alternatively, that supply of free care is lower for
younger children. In addition, the availability of free care is more likely in larger households,
which is consistent with care by grandparents or siblings. The probability of receiving a child
care subsidy by the government is lower for white female heads of households in the South.
Having an extra 1000 dollars in assets lowers the probability of a subsidy by approximately
2 percentage points.
The utility function parameters jointly determine the elasticities of hours worked with
respect to the wage, total income, and the price of child care, which are reported in Table 6.2.
1If a subsidy is available, the family pays only a fraction ( 1
exp(1.56)
) of the cost.
The uncompensated wage elasticity is 0.38, which is a reasonable value for single mothers.
The price of child care elasticities of hours worked and employment are -0.24 and -0.25,
respectively, and are on the low end of previous estimates. The assumption that free care
is always preferred to a partially subsidized child care arrangement contributes to this low
estimate, since about half of the sample are estimated to have access to free care and would
not take up the subsidy.
The fit of the choice probabilities is reasonably good. The actual and fitted frequencies
of choices in the sample are presented in Tables 5.1 and 6.3. The model tends to overpredict
part-time workers at the expense of non-workers. The Pearson Chi-Squared measure of good-
ness of fit in is 109.7 with a critical value of 19.68 at a confidence level of 5 percent. Most
notably, the estimates of all low-frequency cells are very good.
6.2 Policy Simulations
In this section I use the estimates from the model to simulate the labor supply and welfare
participation decision responses of the sample to several alternative policy reforms. The idea
is to consider policy changes in different programs that result in the same level of cost to the
government, and compare the changes in employment and welfare outcomes. The baseline
simulated outcomes are in the first column of Table 6.6. The non-employed comprise 35.1% of
the sample, 18.2% of the sample participate in TANF, 29.1% participate in the Food Stamp
program, and 53.3% are in poverty.2 At the 1997 policy parameter values, the weekly, average,
net transfer per family is estimated at $69.5. It is the sum of the welfare benefits, tax credits,
child care, and wage subsidies (to be included in the analysis below), less the tax that the
family pays to the government.
To provide a benchmark against which to assess the magnitude of the policy changes
that I simulate, consider the EITC expansion from 1993 to 1997. The simulated results from
changing the EITC parameters back to their 1993 values are given in the second column
2See the Federal Guidelines in Table 6.9.
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of Table 6.6. Net transfers decrease by 14.5%, non-employment goes up by 3.4 percentage
points, and the poverty rate increases by 4.5 percentage points. The direction and magnitude
of these effects are consistent with previous work. (see, for example, Meyer and Rosenbaum
2000).
The first reform I examine makes the EITC more generous (column 3).3 This has effects
on employment (an increase of 3.9 percentage points) and the poverty rate (a reduction of
5.1 percentage points) similar to those of the expansion of the EITC from 1993 to 1996.
The resulting net transfer increases to $84.8 per week. The remaining policy simulations
are all calibrated to yield the same net transfer of $84.8. In columns four through eight I
simulate responses to (4) a guaranteed minimum wage rate, (5) a universal wage subsidy, (6)
a reduction in the TANF implicit marginal tax rate, (7) an increase in the availability of child
care subsidies, and (8) implementation of a child care subsidy distribution scheme similar to
the one in the United Kingdom.4
Column (4) presents results for the implementation of a guaranteed minimum wage at
$8.40. Here the government provides an hourly subsidy equal to the difference between the
offered wage and the minimum guaranteed amount. Setting the guarantee at $8.91 yields the
benchmark net transfer of $84.8 per week. This policy has a strong effect on employment of 5.5
percentage points; reduction of poverty and the overall increase in welfare come mainly from
the part of the sample that was poor at the baseline. In all of these respects, the guaranteed
minimum rate performs better than the EITC for the same cost to the government. It should
be noted that I assume no stigma effects associated with wage subsidies; these effects are not
identified in the absence of such subsidies. Implicitly, it is also assumed that the wage subsidy
programs do not cause changes in the wage offer distributions.
The interpretation of the result in column (4) is that this type of earnings subsidy better
targets low-wage workers. The EITC amount is only determined by the taxpayer’s total
3The phase-in and phase-out rates were increased to 0.6 and 0.3, respectively, regardless of the family size,
while keeping the phase-in and phase-out ranges the same. For a family with two qualifying children, this
results in a maximum benefit of $5,484. The benefits completely phase out at a yearly earnings level of $30,210.
4In the United Kingdom, the child care subsidy is given as a part of the EITC and is an entitlement.
Recipients must work at least sixteen hours per week. Family caps are imposed on the maximum child care
subsidy.
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earnings and does not take into account the hourly earnings. For example, a part-time
working mother with two children and an hourly wage of $12 will be eligible for exactly the
same amount (the maximum credit of $3,656) as a full-time working mother at $6 per hour.
Given that the average observed wage in the sample is less than $11, the credit allocated
to the higher-wage worker is probably hard to justify, since she could increase her family’s
income by simply working more (under the 1997 EITC schedule, she would be eligible for
$1,000 even if she started working full-time). If one is concerned about non-employment rates
and welfare of the poor, the wage subsidy would be more efficient. The attractiveness, on the
other hand, of having an EITC schedule that only involves total earnings is that it is very
simple and implies relatively low administrative costs.
The universal wage subsidy of $0.73 in column (5) is less effective than the subsidized
wage in column (4) since it also subsidizes workers with higher wages, who, from a policy
perspective, do not ”need” the aid.
The reduction in the TANF marginal tax rate in column (6) to 41.5% (from close to
100%) causes an insignificant increase in employment but slightly increases the probabilities of
participation in TANF and Food Stamps. This result is consistent with the results discussed
in Moffitt (1992) and Keane and Moffitt (1998). Reducing the marginal tax rate makes
individuals with higher incomes eligible (or almost eligible) and some of them will choose to
decrease their labor supply. From the transition probabilities in Table 6.6 it is evident that
more than half of the decrease in non-employment is offset by workers reducing their hours
of work. The reduction in the poverty rate is negligible and so is the change in the measure
of welfare, both for workers and non-workers, from the baseline results.
Column (7) provides the simulated responses to increasing the availability of child care
subsidies. The outcomes are very similar to those for the EITC reform. In column (8), the
child care subsidy is made available to all working mothers. The subsidy rate is lower, and
caps on the maximum amounts are imposed.5 By redistributing funds in this fashion, the
heads of a larger number of poor families get access to subsidized care and move into the
5This is very similar to the child care subsidy implemented in the UK. The subsidy rate here is $65 with
caps of $100 for a family of two, and $150 for larger families. It should be noted, that according to the model,
if free care is available, it will be used, so the subsidy would not be taken up in this case.
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labor force - the fraction non-employed is similar to the case with a minimum wage subsidy
at roughly five percentage points below the baseline estimated rate.
An interesting issue regarding TANF and Food Stamps is, to what extent the benefits are
able to reach their intended recipients. In the model, there is a trade-off between receiving
welfare benefits and incurring participation costs. Individuals, for which the costs are too
high relative to the benefit, choose not to participate. If the welfare program becomes more
generous, then we should see an increase in recipiency of TANF and Food Stamps. Table 6.10
illustrates the effect of increasing welfare benefits on participation. Increasing the TANF the
maximum benefit by 50 and 100 lead to very humble increases in participation, and especially
in take-up rates among eligible families. Participation and take-up are significantly more
responsive when the same parameter for the Food Stamp program is modified in the same
fashion, indicating lower participation costs for Food Stamps.
Another relevant issue is the accuracy of benefit imputation from the TANF and FS
formulas I use. It could be argued that even if the budget constraint is highly inaccurate,
the flexible utility function of the model would still be able to provide a reasonably good
fit of the discrete choice model. Table 6.2 provides a comparison of the average predicted
and imputed benefits for the individuals who reported collecting benefits and I classified as
eligible for positive benefits. The TANF predicted benefits are on average 52 dollars higher
than those reported, at 417 dollars. The FS average difference, on the other hand, is smaller
at 8 dollars. Distributions of the TANF and FS differences on figures 6.2 and ?? show that
most individuals have a reasonably good knowledge of the size of their benefits. There are
also some obvious misreportings, more notably for TANF, where the reported amount was
higher than the maximum possible for the corresponding state.
6.3 TSF Results and comparisons
Table 6.4 presents estimation results from the TSF estimation with 500 draws. The results
are very similar to those using the Lerman-Manski smoothed SML. The effects of children
on work and welfare participation probabilities have the same magnitude and direction. The
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Table 6.1: Reported and imputed TANF and FS monthly benefits
Mean St. Dev.
Reported TANF benefit 365.14 202.02
Imputed TANF benefit 417.35 172.95
Difference 52.22 174.34
Reported FS benefit 223.77 107.35
Imputed FS benefit 231.88 90.36
Difference 8.11 96.58
Figure 6.1: TANF benefit computation
estimated size of the child care subsidy is almost identical when using either method. No-
tably, the estimated elasticities are comparable at 0.35 and -0.27 for wage and child care cost
elasticities, respectively. This is a good indicator that policy simulation results will not be
sensitive to the estimation technique, which I investigate further by comparing the results
in the already discussed table 6.6 and table 6.7. The estimated average per family weekly
transfer to families is almost identical, and so is the effect of the simulated EITC expansion
on transfers and employment in columns (3). In addition, the ranking of policies by their
effectiveness is fully preserved. The guaranteed wage rate and modified child care subsidy in
column (8) still perform best. The EITC and the child care subsdies have similar effects.
Table 6.8 provides a comparison of key results from the smoothed Lerman-Manski estima-
tor and the TSF estimator for various simulation sizes. Consistently with the results from the
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Figure 6.2: FS benefit computation
Monte Carlo study of Lee and Song (2006), the TSF estimator seems to have an advantage
when using smaller simulation sizes in terms of its ability to fit the discrete choices. The
Pearson Chi-Squared goodness of fit has a lower value for the TSF at for small number of
draws. We observe that the esimated wage and price of child care elasticities converge as the
simulation size increases and are very close when a simulation size of 500 is used. Further
increases in the simulation size did not result in significant changes in estimates. Similarly,
the estimated average weekly per family government transfer gradually stabilizes with the
increase in the simulation size and is very similar at about $70 for the two estimators.
From a practical point of view, even though the TSF estimator seems to have an advantage
for small values of R, it generally required longer estimation times since the estimator is not
a smooth function of its parameters and necessitates a non-gradient numerical optimization
routine 6. Exact perfomance comparisons would be difficult since the number of function
evaluations required by the two methods are different. In addition, parallel proccessing ef-
fectivenes will be different for these optimization techniques, and will also depend on the
complexity of the model.
6I used Nelder-Mead, or downhill simplex method
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Table 6.2 continued
Utility Parameters
βHH ∗ 100 -23.5 δT -1.21
(3.36) (0.59)
βY Y ∗ 10000 -11.93 δF -0.27
(1.34) (0.34)
ψTF 109.24 ηT ∗ 100 -3.55
(18.55) (4.51)
βHY ∗ 1000 24.44 ηF ∗ 100 -7.62
(4.09) (3.48)
Error Standard Deviations
α w T F c
8.08 0.46 139.85 77.10 1.47
(0.89) (0.005) (20.61) (9.74) (0.13)
Error Correlations
α w T F
w 0.58
(0.02)
T -0.19 -0.36
(0.01) (0.01)
F -0.10 0.34 0.17
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
c 0.88 0.20 -0.10 -0.09
(0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)
Elasticities
w 0.38
c (hours) -0.24
c (work) -0.25
Table 6.3: Fitted probabilities for work/program participation choices - Lerman-Manski
SML
Nonworkers Part-time Full-time (total)
FS=0,TANF=0 10.1% 13.1% 46.2% 69.4%
FS=1,TANF=0 6.5% 3.5% 2.4% 12.4%
FS=0,TANF=1 0.9% 0.2% 0.5% 1.6%
FS=1,TANF=1 11.8% 3.4% 1.5% 16.7%
(total) 29.2% 20.3% 50.5% 100.0%
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Table 6.4 continued
Utility Parameters
βHH ∗ 100 -23.19 δT -4.47
(0.06) (0.27)
βY Y ∗ 10000 -12.77 δF 0.16
(0.08) (0.45)
ψTF 165.72 ηT ∗ 100 -9.74
(0.13) (0.39)
βHY ∗ 1000 25.92 ηF ∗ 100 -13.38
(0.13) (0.29)
Error Standard Deviations
α w T F c
7.75 0.96 231.30 88.36 1.92
(0.01 ) (0.10) (0.20 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.60 )
Error Correlations
α w T F
w 0.82
( 0.01)
T 0.086 0.065
(0.03) (0.10)
F -0.157 -0.077 -0.012
(0.03) (0.05) (0.12)
c 0.969 0.701 -0.046 -0.125
(0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.12)
Elasticities
w 0.35
c (hours) -0.27
c (work) -0.27
Table 6.5: Fitted probabilities for work/program participation choices - TSF
Nonworkers Part-time Full-time (total)
FS=0,TANF=0 10.5% 15.9% 38.2% 64.6%
FS=1,TANF=0 5.2% 5.0% 3.2% 13.4%
FS=0,TANF=1 1.3% 0.3% 0.3% 1.9%
FS=1,TANF=1 14.9% 4.1% 1.1% 20.1%
(total) 31.9% 25.3% 42.8% 100.0%
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Table 6.6: Policy Simulations - Lerman-Manski SML
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p(no work) 0.292 0.326 0.253 0.237 0.27 0.281 0.251 0.222
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
p(part-time) 0.203 0.175 0.241 0.214 0.185 0.217 0.211 0.22
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
p(full-time) 0.505 0.498 0.507 0.548 0.545 0.502 0.537 0.558
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
p(tanf) 0.182 0.19 0.172 0.158 0.174 0.206 0.171 0.167
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
p(fs) 0.291 0.304 0.275 0.242 0.275 0.301 0.274 0.266
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
below poverty 0.533 0.578 0.482 0.456 0.482 0.517 0.493 0.48
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
av. Utility 312.162 297.506 330.526 340.547 332.227 315.242 329.258 340.287
(4.518) (4.447) (4.589) (4.738) (4.672) (4.519) (4.69) (4.558)
av utility, poor 143.349 129.626 162.184 178.744 158.006 147.987 171.647 188.728
(4.971) (4.688) (5.368) (5.687) (5.4) (4.979) (5.844) (5.992)
av utility, non-poor 504.485 488.767 522.314 524.883 530.711 505.789 508.82 512.954
(10.945) (10.704) (11.212) (11.412) (11.352) (10.982) (11.025) (10.987)
Transition Probabilities
0→ 20 0 0 0.038 0.048 0.02 0.012 0.025 0.062
(0) (0) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
0→ 40 0 0.002 0.006 0.018 0.014 0.001 0.02 0.03
(0) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
20→ 0 0 0.033 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.007
(0) (0.003) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.001)
20→ 40 0 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.006 0 0.003 0.007
(0) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0) (0.001) (0.001)
40→ 0 0 0.002 0 0 0 0 0 0.001
(0) (0.001) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.001)
40→ 20 0 0.013 0.015 0.001 0 0.006 0 0.005
(0) (0.002) (0.002) (0) (0) (0.001) (0) (0.001)
no change in hours 1 0.949 0.939 0.927 0.959 0.98 0.951 0.888
(0) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
poverty→non-poverty 0 0.002 0.054 0.078 0.051 0.016 0.039 0.062
(0) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
non-poverty→poverty 0 0.048 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.001 0 0.009
(0) (0.004) (0.001) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.002)
av. weekly transfer 69.5 59.4 84.8 84.8 84.8 84.8 84.8 84.8
av. weekly tanf amt 32.5 35.2 29.6 25.7 30.6 46.8 29.2 27.6
av. weekly fs amt 32.4 33.7 31.1 25.1 30.8 32.2 30.3 29.2
av. weekly federal tax amt 21.5 21.6 21.2 25.4 22.3 21.4 22.1 22.7
av. weekly state tax amt 5.8 5.7 5.7 6.7 6 5.7 5.9 6.1
av. weekly federal EITC 22.8 9.7 40.9 23.9 23.4 23.4 24.5 25.5
av. weekly state EITC 0.7 0.3 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8
av. weekly net tax 3.8 17.3 -15.2 7.4 4.1 3.1 2.8 2.5
av. weekly wage subsidies 0 0 0 32 18.6 0 0 0
av. weekly child care subsidies 8.4 7.8 9 9.4 8.9 8.9 28.2 30.5
1 estimated
2. 1993 EITC parameters
3. EITC expansion
4. Guaranteed minimum wage rate = 8.91
5. Universal hourly wage subsidy =0.73
6. TANF implicit tax decrease to 0.415
7. Increase of availability of child care subsidies to 0.30
8. Universal child care, lower subsidy rate =0.44
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Table 6.7: Policy Simulations - TSF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
p(no work) 0.319 0.351 0.281 0.262 0.298 0.31 0.29 0.253
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
p(part-time) 0.253 0.226 0.288 0.28 0.249 0.263 0.252 0.273
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
p(full-time) 0.428 0.423 0.431 0.459 0.453 0.426 0.457 0.474
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
p(tanf) 0.22 0.229 0.209 0.197 0.212 0.23 0.211 0.205
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
p(fs) 0.335 0.348 0.321 0.293 0.324 0.339 0.324 0.319
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
below poverty 0.578 0.615 0.533 0.511 0.542 0.567 0.553 0.545
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
av. Utility 339.938 326.98 356.806 366.363 355.308 342.009 352.614 364.259
(4.27) (4.234) (4.35) (4.478) (4.362) (4.27) (4.397) (4.257)
av utility, poor 184.282 171.635 201.885 217.423 195.501 187.354 204.63 222.877
(5.595) (5.291) (5.909) (6.556) (5.885) (5.61) (5.909) (6.229)
av utility, non-poor 552.953 539.569 568.815 570.186 574.003 553.654 555.129 557.74
(12.964) (12.698) (13.254) (13.341) (13.306) (12.985) (12.997) (12.911)
Transition Probabilities
0→ 20 0 0 0.037 0.054 0.02 0.009 0.021 0.073
(0) (0) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
0→ 40 0 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.009 0 0.015 0.019
(0) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0) (0.002) (0.003)
20→ 0 0 0.032 0 0 0 0.001 0 0.008
(0) (0.003) (0) (0) (0) (0.001) (0) (0.002)
20→ 40 0 0.001 0.003 0.007 0.006 0 0.005 0.012
(0) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0) (0.001) (0.002)
40→ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001
(0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0)
40→ 20 0 0.01 0.009 0 0.001 0.003 0 0.01
(0) (0.002) (0.002) (0) (0) (0.001) (0) (0.002)
no change in hours 1 0.955 0.947 0.927 0.964 0.987 0.959 0.879
(0) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006)
poverty→non-poverty 0 0.001 0.045 0.067 0.037 0.011 0.025 0.042
(0) (0.001) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
non-poverty→poverty 0 0.038 0.001 0 0 0.001 0 0.009
(0) (0.003) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0) (0.002)
av. weekly transfer 68.6 59.7 82.3 82.3 82.3 82.3 82.3 82.3
av. weekly tanf amt 35.6 37.9 33 28.2 34.1 48.8 33.4 31.8
av. weekly fs amt 35.2 36.4 34 28.3 34.1 35.1 33.7 32.8
av. weekly federal tax amt 26 26 25.8 28.6 26.4 25.9 26.7 27.7
av. weekly state tax amt 6.6 6.6 6.6 7.2 6.7 6.6 6.8 7
av. weekly federal EITC 20.6 9.2 37 23.5 21.3 21 21.5 22.4
av. weekly state EITC 0.6 0.3 1.1 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
av. weekly net tax 11.2 23.1 -5.7 11.7 11.2 10.8 11.4 11.6
av. weekly wage subsidies 0 0 0 27.2 15.6 0 0 0
av. weekly child care subsidies 9.1 8.5 9.6 10.1 9.7 9.3 26.6 29.3
1 estimated
2. 1993 EITC parameters
3. EITC expansion
4. Guaranteed minimum wage rate =8.25
5. Universal hourly wage subsidy = 0.67
6. TANF implicit tax decrease to 0.476
7. Increase of availability of child care subsidies = 0.24
8. Universal child care, lower subsidy rate = 0.38
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Table 6.9: 1997 HHS Poverty Guidelines
Size of family unit 48 Contiguous States + DC Alaska Hawaii
1 7,890 9,870 9,070
2 10,610 13,270 12,200
3 13,330 16,670 15,330
4 16,050 20,070 18,460
5 18,770 23,470 21,590
6 21,490 26,870 24,720
7 24,210 30,270 27,850
8 26,930 33,670 30,980
Source: Federal Register, Vol. 62, No. 46, March 10, 1997, pp. 10856-10859
Table 6.10: Welfare Participation Responses to Increases in the Maximum Benefit
Actual Level Changes in TANF Changes in FS
150% 200% 150% 200%
TANF participation (eligibles) 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.38 0.37
FS participation (eligibles) 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.59 0.70
TANF participation (all) 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.19 0.18
FS participation (all) 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.37 0.43
Av. weekly transfer 69.5 89.5 111.7 91.9 115.1
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Conclusions
In this paper I have estimated a structural model of labor supply and multiple program
participation in order to compare the relative effectiveness of welfare, wage subsidy, and child
care subsidy programs in inducing employment and reducing poverty among single mothers in
the 1997 SIPP. I have also applied Donghoon Lee’s TSF esimator (Lee and Song, 2006) to my
discrete choice model and compared the results from the two different estimation techniques.
I stress several main findings. First, I find that a targeted wage subsidy is an attractive
way to encourage employment, increase well-being of the poor, and reduce welfare caseloads.
The results indicate that the positive effects of the Earned Income Tax Credit in the 1990s
could have been achieved at a lower cost. This is an interesting implication of the model
and should be explored in future research in more detail. Second, I confirm that the EITC
contributed to the increased employment of single mothers in the 1990s, which is consistent
with most of the EITC literature (Eissa and Liebman 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2000).
The credit is effective in reducing poverty, but not as effective in increasing labor supply as
certain types of wage and child care subsidies. Third, only extreme reductions in the implicit
marginal tax rates of welfare programs have sizable labor supply effects, and they are very
expensive. Fourth, the current child care subsidy scheme is comparable to the EITC in terms
of its effects on employment and would be more effective if the subsidy became slightly less
generous but available to more single mothers. Fifth, I confirm that the TSF estimator is able
to fit the discrete choice model better for smaller simulations sizes. However, this advantage
is outweighed by the need to use a slower optimization routine.
My findings also suggest that means testing is not an optimal eligibility test for benefits
since it creates work disincentives for workers in certain parts of the earnings distribution (e.g.,
workers with earnings just above the phase-out region of the EITC). Instead, eligibility can
be based on hourly wages. While this would be difficult to implement in welfare programs, it
should be feasible for hourly wage subsidies since a wage would be observed for all who work.
The total amount of the subsidy would only increase with hours worked and not create work
disincentives (the positive estimated elasticities from the model suggest that labor supply of
workers in the sample is not backward bending).
A limitation of the model in this paper is that it does not allow for preferences with respect
to child care arrangements. This is important since child care quality varies significantly and is
a determinant of child outcomes. It would be preferable to endogenize child care choices. This
extended model would explain non-workers paying for care, as well as workers not reporting
any type of child care arrangement.
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